Comment

"Strike Three, Yer Out!?": Examining
the Constitutional Limits on the Use of
Prior Uncounseled DWI Convictions to
Impose Mandatory Prison Sentences on
Repeat DWI Offenders*
INTRODUCTION

In response to public outcry over accidents involving drunk driv-

ers, most states have strengthened their drunk driving laws. 1 Increased penalties for driving while intoxicated (DWI)2 include im-3
prisonment, fines, loss of driving privileges and community service.
As the penalties have become more severe, questions have arisen

concerning the application of the Bill of Rights in DWI cases. Con* The author wishes to thank those who have provided guidance and helpful
recommendations in the production of this Comment, including Harry Zimmerman, Lisa
Werries, Dennis Fisher, and Herb Pounder. This Comment is dedicated to my loving
wife, Kellie, and to babina, Nicole Elysse.
1. In 1983, 40 states increased penalties for drunk driving. In 1982, California
replaced Vehicle Code § 23102 with the more stringent Vehicle Code § 23152.
2. Some states refer to the offense as driving while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor (DUII), operating while under the influence (OUI) or driving while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 291-4(a)(2)
(1985). For the sake of consistency, DWI will be used throughout this Comment. See,
e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
3. In California, penalties for a first time offense include a maximum of six months
imprisonment and a fine up to $1,000, license suspension up to six months with community service and alcohol education programs in lieu of imprisonment. CAL. VEH. CODE §§
13352, 23152, 23160, 23161, 23206 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).

stitutional guarantees including the right to trial by jury, 4 protection

against self-incrimination, 5 and an indigent's right to court-appointed counsel6 have been held inapplicable in many DWI cases.

To further deter drunk driving, most states have enacted
mandatory incarceration sentences for repeat offenders. An indigent's right to court-appointed counsel at repeat offender trials has
been recognized because of the possibility of incarceration.7 However, repeat DWI offenders often receive' actual incarceration
sentences based solely upon prior convictions. Because there has
been an increase in guilty pleas by first time offenders, 8 the constitutionality of using uncounseled convictions to impose mandatory minimum prison sentences has been questioned. Courts differ in permitting the use of these convictions.
This Comment examines the constitutional implications of using
prior uncounseled DWI convictions to incarcerate repeat DWI offenders. Part I reviews the Supreme Court decisions which established the right to court-appointed counsel for the indigent accused.
Part II examines the federal constitutional limitations on the collateral use of prior uncounseled convictions. Part III analyzes state
court decisions involving the collateral use of prior uncounseled DWI
convictions. Part IV critically evaluates these decisions. This Comment concludes that, because an uncounseled conviction is inherently
unreliable, it should not be used to mandatorily incarcerate a DWI
4. See Comment, The Federal ConstitutionalRight to Trial by Juryfor the Offense of Driving While Intocicated, 73 MINN. L. REv. 122 (1988) (concluding that in
most cases DWI is a serious offense requiring a jury trial). But see, Blanton v. City of 14.
Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989). The Court presumed that, for purposes of the sixth
amendment, any offense carrying a maximum prison sentence of six months or less was
viewed by society to be "petty." Id. at 543. Because the maximum authorized prison
sentence for first-time DWI offenders in Nevada did not exceed six months, the Court
held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial. Id. at 545.
5. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990). In Muniz, decided on
June 18, 1990, the Court considered the scope of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination when Muniz was questioned after an arrest for DWI. Muniz had not
been given Miranda warnings. Id. at 2641-42.
The Court held that slurred speech exhibited by Muniz and videotaped at the police
booking facility was not testimonial information, and thus was not protected by the fifth
amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 2645. However,
Muniz' answer to a question that required him to calculate the date of his sixth birthday
was considered compelled testimony and thus violated his fifth amendment right. Id. at
2646-47.
6. The Supreme Court has developed a "bright-line" approach (actual incarceration) that establishes when an indigent's right to court-appointed counsel attaches. See
infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. Because states often do not appoint counsel for
minor offenses, including first DWI offenses, convictions are often obtained without
counsel.
7. See supra note 6.
S. See, e.g., Bellamy, Study Says Safe Roads Act Effective, United Press International, May 24, 1984 (about 80% of those charged with DWI pled guilty in 1984 versus
60% in past years).

Prior Uncounseled DWI Convictions

[VOL. 28: 685, 1991]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

repeat offender.
I.

INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - SUPREME

COURT DECISIONS

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
.. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 9 The rule
that in some circumstances indigent criminal defendants require the
assistance of court-appointed counsel dates back to the famous
"Scottsboro Boys" case of Powell v. Alabama.10 In Powell, seven
uneducated, illiterate, and apparently indigent black defendants,
convicted of raping two white women, were sentenced to death.1" Because of the hostile atmosphere surrounding the trial and the indigent defendants' inability to adequately defend themselves, the, Supreme Court reversed."2 The Court held that the defendants had
been denied due process of law by the trial court's failure to appoint
effective counsel to assist them at their trials.' 3
Although the indigent defendants' due process rights were held to
have been violated in Powell, the Court did not require court-appointed counsel in all state prosecutions.' 4 Ten years later, the Court
reaffirmed its position in Betts v. Brady."5 The Court expressly held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not
demand "that in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a
State must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant."'" The Betts
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10.

287 U.S. 45 (1932).

11. Id. at 45-49.
12. Id. at 71. The Court took note of the following factors in deciding that a fair
trial required the appointment of counsel: the hostile atmosphere in which the trial took
place; the fact that the defendants were constantly under military guard; the ignorance
and illiteracy of the defendants; the fact that the defendants were residents of other
states; and the youth of the defendants. Id.
13. Id. at 71. Justice Sutherland's majority opinion stated that because the assistance of counsel is of such a fundamental character, lack of counsel can impair a defendant's due process rights to a hearing guaranteed by the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. Although the Court noted the question of whether due process required the appointment of counsel to represent defendants in other state criminal
prosecutions, or under other circumstances, the Court limited its holding to the facts of
Powell.
14.

15.
(1963).

Id.

316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

16. Id. at 464. A previous Supreme Court decision held that the sixth amendment
required appointment of counsel to indigents in all federal trials. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938). However, the Betts Court held that the fourteenth amendment's due

Court endorsed a case-by-case analysis of the proceedings to determine 17whether a trial without counsel is fundamentally fair and
right.
For the next twenty-one years, the Betts decision was heavily criticized. Determination of when an indigent criminal defendant required the appointment of counsel proved unworkable.18 Finally, in
1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright'9 the Court formally overruled
Betts2° by holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel was
"fundamental and essential to fair trials.'
Gideon, an indigent defendant accused of a felony, was convicted
after being refused the aid of court-appointed counsel. 22 The Supreme Court reversed and held that an indigent defendant "cannot
be assured a fair trial" without the assistance of court-appointed
counsel. 23 Through the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment,2 4 Gideon requires that states provide a court-appointed counsel
process clause was not necessarily violated when a state failed to appoint.counsel for an
indigent defendant. Betts, 316 U.S. at 461-63.
17. Betts, 316 U.S. at 473.
18. In 1945 the Court held that in some circumstances due process may require
the appointment of counsel to defend an indigent accused in non-capital state cases. Rice
v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945). Three years later, the Court held that due process requires the appointment of counsel in non-capital state felony cases only when there were
"special circumstances." Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948). However, the Court often
found "special circumstances" requiring the appointment of counsel. Annotation, Constitutionally Protected Right of Indigent Accused to Appointment of Counsel in State
Court Prosecution,93 A.L.R.2d 747 (1964 & Supp. 1990).
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

20. Id. at 345.
21. Id. at 344. The indigent defendant, Gideon, was charged with a felony and
subsequently denied appointment of counsel at trial. Gideon presented his defense to the
best of his ability as a layman and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to a five
year prison term. On appeal, Gideon argued that failure to appoint counsel denied him
his sixth amendment right to counsel. The state supreme court rejected Gideon's argument. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 336-37.
22. Id. at 336-37.
23. Id. at 344. In support, the Court noted that both the government and monied
defendants hire the best lawyers possible to prepare and present their cases. The Court
noted a "widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."
Id.

24. Id. at 342. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution denies
the States the power to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.. . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, the sixth amendment's right to
counsel was incorporated through the fourteenth amendment.
Other rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments have been incorporated and
held to be binding on the states by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
These incorporated rights include the rights of speech, press, and religion covered by the
first amendment, see, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927), the fourth amendment

rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), and the fifth amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In addition to the right to counsel, other sixth
amendment rights have been incorporated, including the right to a speedy trial, Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the right to a public trial, In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1948), and the right to confront opposing witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
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to indigent accused. Although the Gideon rationale is not limited to
felony cases, the Supreme Court did not indicate the extent of the
indigent's right to court-appointed counsel until it decided
Argersinger v. Hamlin2 5 in 1972.

Argersinger, an uncounseled indigent defendant, was convicted of
a misdemeanor offense and given a three month jail sentence. 26 The
Florida Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, rejected
Argersinger's argument that he was denied his sixth amendment
right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court
considered whether the right to court-appointed counsel should be

treated similarly to the right to trial by jury. Although the Court
had previously limited the right to jury for trials where potential imprisonment is greater than six months, the
Court refused to similarly
28
limit the right to assistance of counsel.
The Court held that Gideon's rationale extended beyond criminal
felony prosecutions. 29 The Court wrote that counsel is necessary for
a fair trial, even in trials for petty offenses. 30 Because the problems
associated with misdemeanors and petty offenses often require the

presence of counsel to ensure the accused a fair trial, 31 the Court
held that "no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether

classified as petty, misdemeanor,
or felony, unless he was represented
'32
by counsel at his trial.
The Court extended Argersinger the right to court-appointed
(1965).
25. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
26. Id. Argersinger was charged in Florida state court with carrying a concealed
weapon, a misdemeanor offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a $1,000
fine, or both. After representing himself at trial, he was convicted and given a three
month jail sentence. He then brought a habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme
Court, alleging that he had been deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at
26.
27. Id. The Florida Supreme Court followed the rule announced in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that right to jury trial attaches only for trials for
non-petty offenses punishable by more than six months imprisonment). Id. at 27. Because
Argersinger could only be imprisoned up to six months, and not more, his right to courtappointed counsel was held not to attach. Id.
28. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 30.
29. Id. at 32.
30. Id. at 33.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 37 (emphasis added). The Court allows indigent defendants to make a
"knowing and intelligent waiver" of their right to counsel. Id. Many disputes concerning
the collateral use of uncounseled convictions examine the validity of such waivers. There
are no restrictions on the collateral use of uncounseled convictions when a valid waiver is
given. This Comment does not address cases involving valid waivers of the right to
counsel.

counsel because he was imprisoned for his offense. However, it was
not until Scott v. Illinois, 3 decided seven years later, that the Court
clarified the extent of the right it announced in Argersinger. In
Scott, the Court considered whether the right to court-appointed
counsel extended to a defendant who was only fined for an offense
which was punishable by either fine or imprisonment.
Scott, an uncounseled indigent defendant, was convicted of shoplifting and fined. 34 Scott faced a possible jail sentence for the offense. 35 At trial, Scott contended that, according to the Court's rationale in Argersinger, he should have been provided counsel because
imprisonment
was a possible penalty.36 The Supreme Court
37
disagreed.
The Court interpreted Argersinger as stating "that incarceration
was so severe a sanction" that an indigent defendant could .not be
imprisoned unless the defendant had been offered court-appointed
counsel at trial.3 8 However, the Scott Court limited the Argersinger
rule to indigents actually imprisoned. The right to court-appointed
counsel is unavailable to an indigent defendant for which prison is
but a mere possibility. Because Scott had not been imprisoned for his
offense, the Court held that he was not entitled to court-appointed
counsel.39 Therefore, under Scott and Argersinger, a trial court may
constitutionally deny an indigent court-appointed counsel and obtain
a conviction, providing the defendant .is not actually imprisoned as a
result.4 o

II.

LIMITATIONS ON THE COLLATERAL USE OF PRIOR

UNCOUNSELED CONVICTIONS

Scott and Argersinger did not address the issue of whether an un-

counseled conviction which did not result in imprisonment may be
used collaterally. 41 The Court considered this issue for the first time
33.
34.
35.
36.

440 U.S. 367 (1979).
Id. at 368.

Id. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1.

Scott, 440 U.S. at 368

37. Id. at 374.

38. Id. at 372-73.
39.

Id. at 374.

40. Id. Justice Powell concurred although he preferred a more flexible approach to
the appointment of counsel. Id. at 374-75 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented. Id. at 375-89
(Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). The dissenters argued that counsel
should be appointed, not only when the defendant was actually imprisoned, but whenever
imprisonment was an authorized sentence for the offense. Id. at 381-89. They noted that
many states required counsel where any imprisonment was authorized, Id. at 388.
Justice Blackmun also dissented. Id. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He would
have extended the right to court-appointed counsel to an indigent criminal defendant
whose offense was punishable by more than six months imprisonment. Id. at 389-90.
41. In general, any issue raised in a subsequent proceeding that is not directly
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in 1980 when it decided Baldasarv. Illinois.4 2 Baldasar, an indigent

defendant, was convicted of misdemeanor theft. At trial, he was not

represented by counsel.4" Under Illinois law, a first offense for misde-

meanor theft is punishable by fine or imprisonment up to one year,
while a second conviction for the same offense may be treated as a

felony with a prison term of one to three years." Baldasar was only
fined for the first offense.4 5 Within a year he was charged with a
second similar offense. 46 At trial, defense counsel unsuccessfully argued that the prior uncounseled conviction was too unreliable to support enhancing the second offense to a felony. Baldasar was convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison. The Supreme Court
reversed.41
Justice Stewart wrote that Scott48 was violated because the sen-

tence was increased based upon a previously uncounseled conviction.49 Justice Marshall agreed that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction was invalid for the purposes of enhancing
Baldasar's prison sentence.50 He argued that convictions obtained
without counsel were inherently unreliable and did not "become
more reliable merely because
the accused has been validly convicted
' 51
of a subsequent offense.
However, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion reversed
involved in the matter at hand is a collateral issue. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 237 (5th
ed. 1979). Uncounseled, and presumably unreliable, convictions have successfully been
used collaterally to increase sentencing for subsequent offenses. See, e.g., infra notes 67106 and accompanying text. This Comment questions the constitutionality of the collateral use of uncounseled convictions for sentence enhancement purposes. See infra notes
152-91 and accompanying text.
42. 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
43. Id. at 223.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 16-1(e)(1), 1005-8-1(9)(7), 1005-8-3(a)(1), 1005-9l(a)(l)-(2) (1975).
45. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223.
46. Id. Baldasar was charged with stealing a shower head worth twenty-nine dollars. A misdemeanor theft is defined under Illinois law to be a theft of property worth
less than one hundred and fifty dollars. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 16-1(e)(1), 1005-81(b)(5), 1005-8-3(a)(1), 1005-9-1(a)(1)-(2) (1975). See supra text accompanying note
44.
47. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, Brennan, & Stevens, JJ., concurring) (per curiam).
48. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
49. Scott, 440 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J.,concurring).
50. Id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall recognized that
Baldasar's first conviction was constitutionally valid under Scott because he was only
fined and not imprisoned. However, he argued that, although the conviction was valid, it
"was not valid for all purposes." Id. at 226.
51. Id. at 228.

Baldasar's conviction for different reasons.52 He would require courtappointed counsel whenever an indigent defendant is prosecuted for
an offense punishable by more than six months imprisonment. 53
Under this approach, Baldasar was entitled to counsel at his first
trial.54 Because "he was not represented by an attorney, that conviction

. . .

is invalid and may not be used to support enhancement. ' 5

Justice Blackmun therefore did not endorse the plurality's reasoning. However, his vote was necessary to achieve a majority. Because
the majority failed to agree upon a rationale for its result, the scope
of the decision is questionable .5 At the very least, Baldasar established that prior uncounseled convictions, punishable by more than a
six month imprisonment, cannot be used to increase a maximum
prison term under enhanced penalty statutes. 57 The applicability of
the Baldasar rule to subsequent DWI convictions is unclear. Specifically, the question remains whether prior uncounseled convictions
may be used to impose mandatory minimum prison sentences for repeat DWI offenders. The Supreme Court declined to answer that
question when, in 1987, it denied certiorari in Moore v. Georgia.68
III. THE COLLATERAL USE OF PRIOR UNCOUNSELED
CONVICTIONS TO IMPOSE MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON
SENTENCES ON REPEAT DWI OFFENDERS
A.

The Application of Baldasar in the Supreme Court

In Scott, the Supreme Court held that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is constitutionally valid as long as the indigent
defendant is not actually incarcerated.' 9 Baldasar held that such a
conviction could not be used under an enhanced penalty statute to
increase the maximum prison sentence for a subsequent misdemeanor conviction.6" In Moore, the Supreme Court denied certiorari
52. Id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. Id. Justice Blackmun's deciding vote was premised on his dissent in Scott, 440
U.S. 367 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 40.
54. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 230. Baldasar's first conviction was punishable by a
maximum of one year imprisonment and a fine of not more than one thousand dollars.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
55. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 230.
56. See Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions
after Scott and Baldasar,34 U. FLA. L. REv. 517, 529 (1982).
57. Id. The Baldasar Court did not address the question of using prior uncounseled convictions collaterally to increase mandatory minimum penalties. However, because uncounseled convictions, according to sixth amendment precedent, are presumably
unreliable, this Comment suggests that they should not be used collaterally to increase
any penalty, either maximum or minimum. See infra text accompanying notes 162-63.
58. 484 U.S. 904 (1987) (White, J.,dissenting).
59. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
60. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). See supra notes 48-57 and ac-
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when asked whether an indigent defendant's two prior uncounseled
DWI convictions could be used to increase
the minimum prison sen6
tence for a subsequent DWI conviction. 1
Both on the streets and in the courts, Linda Moore was a threetime loser. In 1982, she pled no contest to a DWI charge and was
fined. In 1985, she pled guilty to another DWI charge, was ordered
to pay a fine, perform eighty hours of community service, and surrender her driver's license. Moore, an apparent indigent, had neither
retained nor obtained court-appointed counsel for either conviction.
Four months later, Moore again was arrested for DWI. Georgia
law imposes a mandatory minimum sentence on defendants convicted of DWI three or more times.62 Moore's court-appointed lawyer contended that Baldasar prohibited the court from using her two
previous uncounseled convictions to impose a mandatory minimum
prison term for a third DWI conviction. The trial court rejected that
contention, Moore pled guilty, and the court sentenced her to three
months in jail.
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that
Baldasar was inapposite because the third conviction merely imposed a minimum prison term based on Moore's prior convictions
and did not "increas[e] the maximum confinement authorized [or]
conver[t] a misdemeanor offense into a felony." 6 3 Both the Supreme
Court of Georgia and the Supreme Court of the United States decompanying text.
61. Moore v. Georgia, 484 U.S. 904 (1987). There is no apparent basis for distinguishing between enhancement of maximum jail sentencing and enhancement of minimum jail sentencing. Both enhancements result in increased incarceration time, presumably prohibited by Baldasarand prior sixth amendment precedent. See supra notes 32-57
and accompanying text.
However, because Baldasar was a 5-4 plurality decision, the scope of the decision is
questionable. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text. Changes in public attitude
toward drunk driving and changes in Court membership since 1980 might explain why
certiorari was denied in Moore.
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(c)(1)-(3) (1985). Section 40-6-391(c)(3) provides
in part that:
(c) Every person convicted of violating this Code section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as follows:
(3) For the third or subsequent conviction within a five-year period of time

(A) A fine of $1,000.00, . . . and
(B)(i) A mandatory period of imprisonment of not less than 120 days nor
more than one year ....
Id. at § 40-6-391(c)(3) (emphasis added).
63. Moore v. State, 181 Ga. App. 548, 549, 352 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1987) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 904 (1987).

nied certiorari. 4 In his dissent, Justice White observed that the state
courts were in conflict over whether Baldasar applied to these or
similar facts. 65 Because of the uneven application of Baldasar'sholding in the state courts, he would have granted certiorari "to answer
the outstanding questions concerning Baldasar's scope and proper
application. 66 Since 1980, courts have applied Baldasar in DWI repeat offender cases with differing results. Some states, as Georgia
did in Moore, have narrowed the application of Baldasar and have
allowed the use of prior uncounseled convictions to impose a
mandatory minimum prison term in repeat DWI offender cases.
Others have read Baldasar more broadly and have not allowed the
use of prior uncounseled convictions in similar circumstances. A survey of the application of Baldasar in sentencing repeat DWI offenders may illuminate the differing results.
B. Decisions Allowing the Use of Prior Uncounseled Convictions
to Impose Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentences
on Subsequent DWI Offenders
The rationale for allowing the use of prior uncounseled convictions
to impose mandatory minimum prison terms on repeat DWI offenders is typified in State v. Novak.67 Frank Novak was convicted as a
second-time DWI offender and sentenced to five days in jail. On appeal, Novak's court-appointed counsel argued that it was improper
to impose the mandatory minimum jail sentence required under Wisconsin law for second DWI convictions. His counsel contended that
because the first conviction was obtained without counsel, it could
not be used as a basis for subjecting Novak to incarceration as a
repeat offender.68 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected that
contention.6 9
The court read Baldasaras holding that some uncounseled convictions, valid under Argersinger and Scott because they did not result
in incarceration, "may be used as the basis for sentencing . . . a
repeat offender upon a subsequent conviction. 70° The court noted
that, under Wisconsin law, a first-time DWI offender is not incarcerated but is merely subject to a civil forfeiture.7 1 Because Novak was
64. Moore, 484 U.S. at 904.
65. Id. at 905 (White, J., dissenting).
66. Id. Justice White stated that "[p]ossibly because this Court was sharply divided in Baldasar, with no opinion for reversal gaining more than three votes, courts
attempting to apply that decision have come to different conclusions concerning its meaning." Id.
67. 107 Wis. 2d 31, 318 N.W.2d 364 (1982).
68. Id. at 35, 318 N.W.2d at 366.
69. Id. at 40, 318 N.W.2d at 369.
70. Id. at 41-42, 318 N.W.2d at 369.
71. Id. at 35, 318 N.W.2d at 366.

[VOL. 28: 685. 1991]

PriorUncounseled DWI Convictions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

not exposed to imprisonment in his initial conviction, the court found
that Baldasar did not apply.72
The court considered the consequences of applying a broader interpretation of Baldasar in cases where subsequent DWI offenses
impose mandatory minimum jail terms. It noted that a broader interpretation of Baldasar would require that "every indigent person
accused of first offense drunk driving" be appointed counsel at public
expense.73 On balance, the court held that the increased costs of providing counsel would "far outweigh any possible 'benefits' [that]
such [a] requirement would produce.1 74 The court concluded by
holding that "under Baldasar, . . . the United States Constitution
do[es] not preclude imposing incarceration upon a second [D]WI
conviction where the defendant was not represented
by counsel in the
'7 5
proceedings leading to the first conviction.
A year later, the Wisconsin court's rationale was embraced by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Schindler
v. Clerk of Circuit Court.76 Schindler, an apparent indigent, was
77
charged with his third DWI offense within a five year period.
Under the statute, a second DWI offense within a five year period
requires the imposition of a five-day minimum jail sentence; a third
DWI offense within the same period requires the imposition of a
thirty-day minimum jail sentence.7 8 Schindler's two prior DWI convictions were obtained without counsel.
At trial, Schindler's counsel argued that Baldasar prohibited the
72.

Id. at 39, 318 N.W.2d at 368.

73.

Id. at 42, 318 N.W.2d at 370.

74.

Id.

75. Id. at 40, 318 N.W.2d at 369.
76. 715 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).
77. Id. at 342.
78. Id. At the time of Schindler's trial the DWI statute provided in part:
(2)(a) Any person violating s. 346.63(1) [operating a motor vehicle under the

influence of an intoxicant]:
1. Shall forfeit not less than $100 nor more than $500, except as provided in
subd. 2 or 3.

2. Shall be fined not less than $250 nor more than $1,000 and imprisoned
not less than 5 days nor more than 6 months if the total of revocations under s.

343.305 and convictions for violation of s. 346.63(1) or local ordinances in conformity therewith equals 2 within a 5-year period ....

3. Shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than $2,000 and imprisoned
for not less than 30 days nor more than one year in the county jail if the total
of revocations under s. 343.305 and convictions for violation of s. 346.63(1) or
local ordinances in conformity therewith equals 3 or more within a 5-year period ....

Id. n.1 (emphasis added) (citing WIs. STAT. § 346.65(2)(a) (1979-80)).

imposition of the enhanced sentence predicated upon the earlier uncounseled conviction. The trial court found Baldasar inapplicable
and sentenced Schindler to jail for the mandatory minimum period
imposed on third-time DWI offenders under the Wisconsin statute.
Relying on Baldasar, the district court reversed. The district court
held that, under Baldasar,an uncounseled civil forfeiture may not
be used to enhance a jail sentence imposed by a later conviction. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.80 It decided that Baldasar did not apply because of "the failure of the
Baldasar majority to agree upon a rationale for its result." 81 The
court reasoned that Schindler's prior uncounseled DWI conviction
was not used to support guilt or enhance punishment for his subsequent conviction, and thus did not violate the Baldasar rule. 82
Rather, the prior uncounseled conviction "had the effect of specifically putting Schindler on notice" of the consequences of repeated
offenses and warned him that future DWI "violations would subject
him to criminal sanctions. ' 83 The initial conviction was merely used
to "establish his deviant conduct and classification for future drunk
driving violations. 84 The court questioned the wisdom of applying
the Baldasar rule in these specific circumstances. It asserted that
requiring court-appointed counsel for DWI first-offense trials "would
prove burdensome, exorbitantly expensive, and in many cases completely unnecessary."s Based on these public policy reasons, the
court held that an uncounseled DWI conviction may be used to establish the status of the defendant. Once established, the mandatory
minimum prison sentence is then merely "predicated on the defendant's status as an adjudicated offender, not on the reliability of the"
prior uncounseled conviction."8 Thus, the court held that Baldasar
was not violated and that the prior uncounseled conviction "may provide a basis" for subjecting a defendant to a mandatory minimum
prison sentence.
87
Schindler, and other decisions that interpret Baldasar narrowly,
79. Id.
80. Id. at 347.
81. Id. at 344.
82. Id. at 345.
83. Id. at 346.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Robles-Sandoval, 637 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981) (uncounseled deportation conviction may be used to create the status of deportee for the
defendant and was not invalid for the purpose of supporting guilt or enhancing punishment in subsequent criminal proceeding for illegally reentering the United States after
deportation); State v. O'Neill, 473 A.2d 415 (Me. 1984) (uncounseled DWI conviction
may be used to classify defendant as a habitual offender and subject the defendant to
criminal sanctions for operating vehicle after revocation of license); and Commonwealth
v. Thomas, 510 Pa. 106, 507 A.2d 57 (Pa. 1986) (uncounseled retail theft summary
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rely on both public policy and the classification rationale discussed
above. The rationale that uncounseled convictions may be used to
place defendants into a status which may subsequently be used to
impose longer jail sentences was derived from the Supreme Court's
decision in Lewis v. United States.8
In 1961, George Lewis, Jr., without counsel, pled guilty to a felony in a Florida state court and served a term of imprisonment. 9 In
1977, sixteen years later, Lewis was charged with knowingly receiving and possessing a firearm in violation of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.90 The Act makes it a federal criminal offense for a person who "has been convicted by a court of the United
States or of a State ... of a felony" to receive, possess, or transport

a firearm.9 1
At trial, Lewis contended that, under Gideon, a violation of the
statute could not be predicated on a prior conviction obtained in the
absence of defense counsel. The .trial court rejected that contention
and ruled that the constitutionality of the prior conviction was immaterial when used to establish Lewis' status as a previously convicted felon. 2 The decision was affirmed on appeal and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 93
The Court focused on the statutory language and legislative history of the Act.94 The Court found that Congress could rationally
classify a person as a felon without requiring proof of "the validity of
the predicate conviction. 95 Accordingly, Congress could rationally
use any prior felony conviction, "even an allegedly invalid one," as a
basis on which to prohibit possession of a firearm. The convicted
felon is "presumptively dangerous" 97 and prohibited from transportoffense convictions may be'used under an enhanced penalty statute to convert subsequent
offenses into misdemeanors which carry longer prison term sentences).
88. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
89. Id. at 56-57. Lewis was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. Id.
90. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976).
91. Id. Section 1202(a)(1) provides in part that any person who has been convicted
of a felony and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce any firearm shall be
fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than two years, or
both. Id.
92. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 58.

93. Id.

94. Id. at 60-66.
95. Id. at 63.
96. Id. at 66.
97. Id. at 64. The Court, in interpreting the statute, noted that it "prohibits categories of presumptively dangerous persons from transporting or receiving firearms." Id.
(emphasis added). The language of the statute and legislative intent made it clear to the

ing or receiving firearms. Therefore, the Court held that a prior uncounseled felony conviction resulting in imprisonment, although presumptively unreliable, could be used as a basis for imposing criminal
sanctions for violations of the Act.9 8 Because "[e]nforcement of that
essentially civil disability through criminal sanctions does not 'support guilt or enhance punishment',"8' 9 it is permissible. 100
Many of the decisions permitting the use of prior uncounseled convictions for imposing mandatory minimum prison sentences for subsequent DWI convictions cite Lewis to support their holdings. For
example, the Schindler court found the civil firearms disability imposed on Lewis analogous to the civil forfeiture conviction imposed
on Schindler.101 Similar to the Lewis "status" rationale, the Schindler court interpreted the Wisconsin statute as creating a status of
convicted DWI offenders.' 0 2 Once established in that category, an
individual is subject to criminal sanctions such as mandatory minimum prison terms.'0 3
Although Lewis was decided two months before Baldasar,1°0 it
was mentioned only once in a footnote appended to the dissent's
opinion. 05 Lewis was neither overruled nor narrowed by Baldasar.
Because of the conflicting results, the Court sent a confusing message to the state courts, which responded with diverse holdings. 100
Court that a person could be placed in this category via an unconstitutional, and therefore invalid conviction. Id. at 63.
98. Id. at 67. The Court observed that Congress was focusing on the nexus between violent crime and the possession of firearms by people with criminal records. Id. at
66. The statute was enacted in response to an increase in political assassinations and
violent crime. Id. at 63. Because the mere fact of conviction would classify a person as a
convicted felon, its validity was immaterial with regard to the classification. Id. at 62.
99. Id. at 67 (quoting Burgett v. Texas 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967)).
100. Id. The Court relied on two premises in reaching its conclusion: First, the
Court stated that they had repeatedly "recognized ...that a legislature constitutionally
may prohibit a convicted felon from engaging in activities far more fundamental than the
possession of a firearm." Id. at 66. Second, the Court found that "it [was] important to
note that a convicted felon may challenge the validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise
remove his disability, before obtaining a firearm." Id. at 67. Because a convicted felon
could have challenged the prior uncounseled conviction in order to remove the firearm
disability, the Court held that the firearms prosecution did not "open the predicate conviction to a new form of collateral attack." Id.
101. Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).
102. Id. at 347. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
103. Schindler, 715 F.2d at 347.
104. Lewis was decided on February 27, 1980. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55
(1980). Baldasar was decided on April 22, 1980. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222
(1980). Interestingly, Baldasar was argued before Lewis. Baldasarwas argued on November 26, 1979; Lewis was argued on January 7, 1980.
105. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 234 n.3 (Burger, CJ., Powell, White & Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting). The dissenters argued that the Baldasar"decision is all the more puzzling in
view" of the decision in Lewis. Id.
106. For a critical analysis of the two decisions, see generally Case Comment,
Constitutional Law; Sixth Amendment; Right to Counsel; Use of Prior Uncounseled
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To this point, this Comment has investigated the line of decisions
that have narrowly interpreted the Baldasar rule. A survey of decisions which have interpreted Baldasar more broadly follows. These
decisions disallow the use of uncounseled convictions to impose
mandatory minimum prison terms on repeat DWI offenders.
C. Decisions Disallowing the Use of Prior Uncounseled
Convictions to Impose Mandatory Minimum Prison
Sentences on Subsequent DWI Offenders
The rationale for disallowing the use of prior uncounseled convictions to impose mandatory minimum prison terms on repeat DWI
offenders is typified in State v. Dowd.117 Kirk Dowd was charged
with operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. His license
had been suspended as a result of a prior uncounseled DWI conviction. 0 8 At trial, Dowd stipulated to having operated a vehicle with a
suspended license.'09 However, Dowd's counsel argued that the court
could not impose the mandatory jail sentence for driving with a suspended license. 110 Dowd's counsel contended that, because the DWI
conviction had been obtained without counsel, it could not be used as
a predicate for the subsequent suspended license offense."' The
court rejected that contention and sentenced
Dowd to a seven day
2
affirmed."1
Court
Superior
The
jail term.
The Supreme Court of Maine vacated the sentence."13 In comparing the Lewis and Baldasar rationale, the court concluded that they
could be distinguished by analyzing the statutes involved in those
cases. "The distinction . . . is whether the statute considered en-

hances punishment, or punishes criminally a civil disability which
has been imposed by" the legislature." 4 In analyzing the DWI statute, the court found that imprisonment is mandatory only when the
underlying license suspension is a result of a conviction for DWI or
failure to submit to a blood-alcohol test." 5 Because a prior uncounConvictions: Lewis v. United States & Baldasar, 14 AKRON L. REv. 155 (1980).
107. 478 A.2d 671 (Me. 1984).
108. Id. at 674.
109. Dowd, an indigent, was represented by court-appointed counsel at trial. Id. at
n.5.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 678. Maine has no appellate court other than the supreme court.
Id. at 678 (emphasis added).
Id.

seled conviction directly results in enhancement of a prison sentence
in this case, the "result is contrary to the teaching of
Baldasar..

."I16 The court held that "no mandatory penalty could

be imposed" for driving with a suspended license where
the license is
117
suspended because of an uncounseled conviction.
In similar circumstances, the Supreme Court of North Dakota
compared the Lewis and Baldasardecisions when it decided State v.
Orr."8 Kenneth Orr was convicted of DWI. He appealed after being
sentenced as a second offender. The supreme court held that Orr
could not be sentenced to mandatory imprisonment as a second DWI
offender when his first DWI conviction resulted from an uncounseled
guilty plea. 1" 9
On appeal, the state argued that the DWI statute, 120 like the statute in Lewis, did not enhance punishment due to a past conviction.
Rather, the state argued that "the focus of the increased punishment
provided by [the DWI statute] is not on the reliability of the previous uncounseled conviction, but on the mere fact of conviction.''
The supreme court disagreed. 22 It found the DWI statute distinguishable from the federal gun disability statute of Lewis for two
major reasons: (1) "[a] first DWI conviction may result in incarceration and is therefore not an essentially civil disability," and (2) the
DWI statute, unlike the federal statute in Lewis, does not permit 23
a
DWI offender to expunge or limit the effect of a DWI conviction.
Consequently, the court concluded that it was "clearly an enhancement statute that necessarily focuses on the reliability1' of
the first
24
conviction, and not on the mere fact of its occurrence.'
Guided by the sixth amendment decisions of the Supreme Court,
especially Argersinger and Scott, the court explained the rationale
for its decision:
[w]hether the imprisonment is a result of a first conviction, as in Scott, or
because of a conviction for a subsequent offense, as in Orr's case, makes no
difference. Merely because Orr was validly convicted of a second offense
does not confer reliability on his earlier uncounseled conviction. Furthermore, because the defect in Orr's prior conviction was the denial of counsel,
he would, in effect, "suffer anew" the deprivation of his right to counsel if
he were subsequently imprisoned solely because of the previous uncounseled
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
119. Id. at 178-79.
120. The DWI statute provides that the sentence for a second DWI conviction
within five years must include at least four-days' imprisonment, of which 48 hours must
be served consecutively, or ten-days' community service, at least a $500.00 fine and referral for addiction evaluation. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(4)(b) (1985 & Supp. 1991).
121. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 177.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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25

conviction.1

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision
and remanded with instructions that Orr be sentenced as if he had
no prior conviction. 2 '
The Orr court recognized the practical consequences of its decision. Courts following it would need to obtain a valid waiver of counsel or appoint counsel for an indigent DWI defendant "regardless of
the penalty to be imposed, if enhancement of punishment for a subsequent conviction is not to be precluded." 111 7 While this may impose
an economic burden on the state,
the Orr court emphasized that the
"constitution must prevail."' 2 The court held that the constitutional
rights of DWI indigent defendants that commit subsequent DWI offenses cannot be dependent upon a theory that it is less expensive to
deny them their rights rather than to afford them. 29
Under similar circumstances, a 1987 Virginia Court of Appeals
decision, Sargent v. Commonwealth,'3 0 applied Baldasar broadly

when it prohibited a mandatory minimum jail sentence for a third
DWI offense, because it was predicated on an uncounseled DWI
conviction.' At trial, Timmy Joe Sargent was convicted of DWI,
his third offense within five years. Sargent, an apparent indigent,
was not represented by counsel at his two earlier convictions. Despite
Sargent's argument that the uncounseled convictions could not be
constitutionally used to enhance his sentence for132
a third offense, the
trial court imposed a three-month jail sentence.
On appeal, the court of appeal considered the question whether
the two misdemeanor convictions for DWI could be used to enhance
punishment for a third DWI offense.' 33 The state argued that because the predicate convictions did not result in Sargent's incarceration, they were not prohibited by Baldasarand were properly used to
convict and sentence him as a third offender under the DWI stat-

125. Id. at 178.
126. Id. at 180.
127. Id. at 179.
128.

Id.

129. Id.
130. 5 Va. App.
131. Id. at 150,
132. Id. at 145,
133. Id. at 146,

143, 360 S.E.2d 895 (1987).
360 S.E.2d at 899.
360 S.E.2d at 896.
360 S.E.2d at 896-97.

ute.13 4 The court of appeal disagreed.135
Although the court agreed that the two prior convictions were constitutionally "valid convictions since no jail time was imposed," it
held that they "cannot be used under an enhanced penalty statute"
such as the one involved here. 3 ' The court disagreed with the state's
contention that Baldasar should be narrowly applied. It stated that
Baldasarrests on the "fact of the prison term rather1 3than
the classi7
fication of the offense as a felony or misdemeanor.
The court noted that, although Sargent's sentence was within the
range permissible for a first offense, he was in fact tried and sentenced for a third DWI offense. The court concluded that imposing a
mandatory minimum jail sentence based on prior uncounseled convictions was enhancement of sentencing and was not "in keeping
with the teaching of Baldasar. . .. ,"18 The court reversed Sargent's
conviction holding that:
Sargent could not constitutionally have been imprisoned for either one of
his previous convictions unless he was represented by counsel or waived his
right to such representation. The Supreme Court's decision in Baldasarprohibits the Commonwealth now from doing indirectly what it could not accomplish directly in the case of either of Sargent's two prior convictions.'1 9

Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Moore,1 40 and because the Baldasar majority did not agree upon a rationale for its
results,1 4 1 the state courts have applied the rule announced in
Baldasar with differing and confusing results. Lewis v. United
States1 42 merely amplified the confusion, as witnessed by the decisions discussed above. When courts have construed Baldasar narrowly, allowing the use of uncounseled convictions for imposing
mandatory minimum prison sentences on repeat DWI offenders, they
have typically used one of the following three approaches.
First, by distinguishing the facts in their cases from the facts of
Baldasar,some courts, such as State v. Novak, hold that Baldasar
134. Id. at 147, 360 S.E.2d at 898. When the first two DWI convictions occurred
in 1982, the statute provided in part that upon conviction of a first DWI offense, the
defendant may be fined and jailed for not more than twelve months. VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-270 (1950 & Supp. 1991).
A second offense carried a fine and a jail sentence of not less than one month nor more
than one year; forty-eight hours of jail sentence may not be suspended. Id. A third offense carried a fine and a jail sentence of not less than two months nor more than one
year; thirty days of the jail sentence may not be suspended. Id.
135. Sargent, 5 Va. App. at 149, 360 S.E.2d at 899.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 150, 360 S.E.2d at 899.
138. Id. at 153, 360 S.E.2d at 901.
139. Id. at 155, 360 S.E.2d at 902 (emphasis added).
140. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
142. 445 U.S. 55 (1980). See supra notes 88-106 and accompanying text,
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does not apply.143 Second, by using the "status" rationale of Lewis"'
to hold that an uncounseled conviction could validly place a defendant into a status as a "convicted offender," other courts, such as
Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, hold that Baldasar does not
apply. 145 Third, by balancing the costs with the benefits, some
courts,
1 46
such as Schindler, hold that Baldasar should not apply.
Conversely, when courts construe Baldasar broadly, disallowing
the use of uncounseled convictions for imposing mandatory minimum
prison sentences on repeat DWI offenders, they reject these approaches. Sargent v. Commonwealth, for example, held that the essential Baldasar fact inquiry is whether incarceration is based upon
an uncounseled conviction. If incarceration is based solely upon an
uncounseled conviction, these courts apply the Baldasar rule and 1do
47
not distinguish the facts of their cases from the facts of Baldasar.
Some courts, such as State v. Orr, reject the Lewis "status" approach.1 48 These courts hold the Lewis statute distinguishable from
DWI statutes and prohibit the use of uncounseled convictions to impose mandatory minimum jail terms based upon a defendant's status
as a "convicted offender." 49 Finally, some courts, similar to the
court in Orr, have recognized the economic burden of appointing
counsel for indigent DWI offenders. 150 Although it may impose an
economic burden on the state, these courts hold that the appointment
of counsel is required by the constitution.151
The following is a critical analysis of the different rationales used
by the courts in their application of Baldasar to repeat DWI cases.
IV.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF BALDASAR IN

REPEAT

DWI

OFFENDER DECISIONS

Decisions that interpret Baldasar narrowly, allowing the use of
prior uncounseled DWI convictions, employ rationales which can be
classified as: (1) factual distinctions; (2) status; and (3) public policy
143. Novak, 107 Wis. 2d at 39, 318 N.W.2d at 368 (1982). See supra notes 67-75
and accompanying text.
144. 445 U.S. 55 (1980). See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
145. Schindler, 715 F.2d at 344. See supra notes 82-84, 101-03 and accompanying
text.
146. Schindler, 715 F.2d at 347. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Sargent, 5 Va. App. at 150-51, 360 S.E.2d at 899. See supra notes
136-38 and accompanying text.
148. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 177 (N.D. 1985). See supra notes 123-25.
149. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 177.
150. Id. at 179. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
151. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 179. See supra text accompanying note 129.

arguments. The analysis below demonstrates why these arguments
do not pass muster in light of the Supreme Court's sixth amendment
decisions. 152
A.

Factual Distinctions

As noted above, some courts distinguish the facts in their cases
from the facts in Baldasar to hold Baldasar inapplicable. 1 3 The
Moore v. Georgia court determined that Baldasarwas inapposite because Moore's third conviction merely imposed a minimum prison
term based on prior uncounseled convictions and did not enhance the
maximum prison term. 5 4 The State v. Novak court found Baldasar
inapposite because Novak had not been exposed to incarceration at
his initial DWI conviction. 155 Although factual distinctions can be
made between Baldasar and most DWI repeat offender cases, the
importance of these distinctions fades when one considers Baldasar's
underlying rationale.
Baldasaris the culmination of the Supreme Court's sixth amendment decisions starting with Powell v. Alabama.15 6 Underlying the
holding of Baldasaris the strong belief that lawyers are essential to
ensure fair trials with accurate and reliable results. 157 The right to
counsel is considered to be more essential to a fair trial than the
right to a jury trial.158 Because uncounseled convictions are considered to be inherently unreliable, 5 9 they may not be used for "incarceration" purposes.1 60
152. See supra notes 9-40 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 510 Pa. 106, 507 A.2d 57 (1986) (holding that convictions for summary offense of retail theft entered without the assistance of
counsel or valid waiver did not prohibit enhancement for second offense of retail theft
from summary offense to misdemeanor).
The concurring opinion distinguished the facts of Baldasarfrom the facts in Thomas.
Because the possible sentence for the defendant's first offense was the same as the second, which enhanced the offense from summary offense to a misdemeanor, the concurring opinion stated that although the "gradingof the offense was affected, there [was] no
evidence that the sentence" had been enhanced. Id. at 112, 507 A.2d at 64 (emphasis in
original).
154. Moore, 181 Ga. App. at 549, 353 S.E.2d at 822. See supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
155. State v. Novak, 107 Wis. 2d 31, 39, 318 N.W.2d 364, 368 (1982). See supra
notes 70-72.
156. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 13, 21, 23, 24, 30, 31 and accompanying text.
158. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1972). See supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying notes.
159. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980). See supra note 50 and
accompanying text. Justice Marshall believed that uncounseled convictions were inherently unreliable and did not "become more reliable merely because the accused has been
validly convicted of a subsequent offense." Baldasar,446 U.S. at 227-28.
160. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979). See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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Although the facts of Baldasar may differ from most DWI repeat
offender cases, the Baldasar rationale applies to these cases. The
idea that incarceration is too serious a penalty to impose on an uncounseled defendant transcends Baldasar's fact pattern. Uncounseled convictions are presumptively unreliable.161 This presumption
has never been seriously questioned by either the Supreme Court or
any of the courts surveyed. Unless the assumption underlying the
Court's sixth amendment decisions is erroneous, courts which attempt to factually distinguish DWI repeat offender cases from
Baldasar are misguided.
In order for Baldasarto apply, the only factual determination necessary is whether a defendant's prison sentence is enhanced by an
uncounseled conviction. If it is, Baldasarprohibits it. The applicability of Baldasar does not depend upon the label the state affixes to
the enhancement . 62 "Minimum" and "maximum" prison term enhancements both result in increasing a defendant's prison term based
on an inherently unreliable uncounseled conviction. In fact, using an
uncounseled conviction to impose a mandatory minimum prison term
might actually be more repugnant than using it to increase the maximum prison term. A judge has discretion in the latter circumstance
while no discretion is allowed in the former.
Nor should the applicability of Baldasardepend upon the nomenclature of the enhanced sentence. Whether a sentence is changed
from a "misdemeanor" to a "gross misdemeanor" or to a "felony" is
6
unimportant, so long as the prison term is not increased.. 3
In summary, when the underlying rationale of Baldasar is
remembered, the factual distinctions fade in importance. It is not the
type of offense or the possibility of incarceration that is important.
Rather, the crucial factual determination required by Baldasar is
whether an uncounseled conviction has been used to enhance a de161. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 228. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., State v. Dowd, 478 A.2d 671 (Me. 1984). Although the defendant
was given a jail sentence for operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, the
court vacated the sentence because the license suspension was the result of an uncounseled conviction. Id. at 678. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
The determining factor in applying Baldasar was not the label of the enhancement
(operating a vehicle with a suspended license). Rather, the determining factor in applying Baldasarwas the fact that the defendant's prior uncounseled conviction directly resulted in the enhancement of his prison sentence. This, the court held, was prohibited by
Baldasar.Dowd, 478 A.2d at 678.
163. See, e.g., Sargent v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 143, 360 S.E.2d 895 (1987).
The court in Sargent concluded that Baldasar rests upon the "fact of the prison term
rather than the classification of the offense as a felony or misdemeanor . .. ." Sargent, 5
Va. App. at 150, 360 S.E.2d at 899.

fendant's prison term. If it has, Baldasar applies to prohibit it.
B.

Status

The Schindler court reasoned that an uncounseled DWI conviction had the effect of putting a defendant on "notice" and validly
served as a warning that future DWI violations would result in imprisonment. 64 The
Supreme Court used similar rationale in Lewis v.
1 65
United States.
Relying heavily on the statutory language involved in Lewis, the
Court concluded that a prior felony conviction, even an inherently
unreliable one, could
be used to classify individuals into the status of
"convicted felon."' 166 Once the defendant was so classified, the Court
held that it was constitutional to enforce the civil disability (firearms
prohibition) with criminal sanctions (including incarceration). 67 Because the statute relied upon the mere fact of a conviction, not the
reliability of a conviction, the Court concluded that a defendant
could be incarcerated even though his or her class status was predicated on an inherently unreliable conviction.' 6 8 Because this rationale is questionable and inconsistent with previous sixth amendment
law, it should be scrutinized when applied in cases including repeat

DWI offenders.
Lewis is distinguishable from Baldasar. Lewis does not permit
sentence enhancement based upon prior uncounseled convictions.',
Rather, Lewis merely permits placement into a civil status which is
criminally punishable. Conversely, courts which allow the collateral
use of prior uncounseled convictions directly enhance sentencing of
repeat DWI offenders. Attempting to apply the Lewis holding, those
courts maintain that a DWI offender, once convicted, is placed into
the status of convicted DWI offender. 70 Once placed in that status,
the convicted DWI offender is subject to mandatory incarceration
for subsequent offenses. Although this approach is clever, it undermines sixth amendment precedent through Baldasar.
Using the Lewis "status" rationale, courts find that legislatures
may use a conviction, "even an allegedly invalid one,"' 7' to classify a
164. Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes notes 82-83.
165. 445 U.S. 55 (1980). See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
166. Lewis; 415 U.S. at 66.
167. Id. at 67. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
168. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 67. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., State v. Novak, 107 Wis. 2d 31, 318 N.W.2d 364 (1982); Schindler
v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068
(1984). See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 71-72 and notes 85-86.
171. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980). See supra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text.
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defendant as a convicted offender. 172 However, it is unreasonable to
assume that legislatures intend to impose mandatory minimum
prison sentences for repeat DWI offenses predicated upon constitutionally invalid and inherently unreliable DWI convictions.
In fact, because of the assumed inherent lack of reliability of uncounseled convictions to enhance sentencing, it would be unconstitutional for statutes to be enacted which explicitly allowed their use.
Because legislatures are constitutionally prohibited from enacting
statutes which would explicitly allow the use of uncounseled convictions to enhance sentencing, courts should not interpret statutes to
implicitly allow their use. Apparently, the courts using the Lewis rationale are persuaded that legislatures may constitutionally enact
statutes which deny a defendant's right to counsel. This is inconsistent with sixth amendment precedent from Powell through
Baldasar.

In addition, superimposing the Lewis rationale onto DWI repeat
offender cases is somewhat misguided. The Lewis Court gave great
deference to Congress and its goals in enacting the firearms disability act. 7 3 The Court held that a firearms disability, as opposed to
enhanced criminal sentencing, could be predicated upon an uncounseled felony conviction.17 4 The Court further recognized that the
statute allowed a defendant to challenge his conviction and remove
the disability.'7 5 Finally, the Court recognized that a legislature may
prohibit convicted felons from engaging in activities far more fundamental to personal freedom than possession of firearms. 7 6 Obviously,
there are important public safety reasons for ridding the highways of
drunken drivers. However, the analogy between a federal statute,
which prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms and committing assasinations, and state DWI statutes, is stretched. As the
court in State v. Orr found, DWI statutes, unlike the federal statute
involved in Lewis, do not permit a DWI offender to expunge or limit
the effect of his uncounseled DWI conviction.177 Nor will an indigent
likely challenge such a conviction until charged with a subsequent
offense. Presumably, an indigent will plead guilty to a first offense
172.

See, e.g., Schindler, 715 F.2d at 341. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note

86.
173. See supra note 98.
174. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 67. See supra note 96-98 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 100.
176. Id. at 66. See supra note 100.
177. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 177 (N.D. 1985). See supra text accompanying note 123.

because the penalty is small compared to the cost of retaining counsel. Thereafter, motivation for challenging the conviction dissipates.
Finally, while legislatures may prohibit convicted felons from engaging in activities far more fundamental than possession of firearms, it may not prohibit indigents from exercising their constitutional rights. However, courts which permit mandatory minimum
prison sentences, predicated upon prior uncounseled DWI convictions, allow legislatures to do what they could not otherwise constitutionally accomplish. As the court in Sargent v. Commonwealth declared, Baldasar prohibits a legislature from "doing indirectly what
it could not accomplish directly." 117 8 Baldasaris not concerned with
exactly how a prison term is enhanced by a prior uncounseled conviction. Rather, Baldasar is concerned with when a prison term is
enhanced, either directly or indirectly, by a prior uncounseled conviction. Baldasarprohibits such enhancement, whether accomplished
indirectly by placing the indigent into a "status" or through a more
direct approach.
C. Public Policy Arguments
Both the Novak and Schindler courts weighed the desirability of
repeat DWI offender statutes with the costs of appointing counsel to
ensure the reliability of first offense convictions. 179 The Novak court
observed that applying the Baldasar rule would require that all indigent defendants accused of a first DWI offense be appointed counsel.
It found this requirement too costly and held that the increased costs
of such a requirement would far outweigh any possible benefits.180
The Schindler court was similarly fearful of the economic effects
of applying Baldasarunder these circumstances. 181 It feared that requiring a court appointed counsel for indigents charged with a first
DWI offense would "impose severe burdens on the State... (which]
would prove burdensome, exorbitantly expensive, and in many cases
completely unnecessary."182

Although these are valid concerns, constitutional rights cannot be
dependent upon a theory that it is more economical to deny them
than to afford them.18 3 Economic considerations realize diminished
relevance when constitutional guarantees are involved. 18 4 Because an
178. Sargent v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 143, 156, 360 S.E.2d 895, 902 (1987).
See supra text accompanying note 139.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74, and 85.
180. Novak, 107 Wis. 2d at 42, 318 N.W.2d at 370 (1982). See supra text accompanying note 74.
181. Schindler, 715 F.2d at 347.
182. Id.
183. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963). See also supra text
accompanying note 129.
184. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 384-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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indigent defendant "cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided,"' 85 a state deprives the defendant's liberty without due
process when it denies counsel due to economic considerations.
Although it could be argued that the constitution forbids deprivation of any liberty interest without due process, Argersinger v. Hamlin and Scott v. Illinois drew the line at incarceration.'8 6 Appointing
indigents counsel in first offense DWI trials may be costly, but it is
required if the state imposes mandatory minimum prison sentences
for subsequent offenses. As the State v. Orr court declared, the constitution "must prevail.' 8 7 The Orr court noted that not all DWI
defendants are indigent, and not all DWI violations recur. 8 8 The
economic burden of requiring court-appointed counsel might not be
as severe as the Schindler court suggested.
Finally, there was concern in both the Novak and Schindler decisions that the costs of providing court-appointed counsel would far
outweigh any possible "benefits."' 8 9 The Schindler court stated that
in many cases such appointment would be completely unnecessary. 90
While this may be true, it is difficult to verify. The Supreme Court
assumes that uncounseled convictions are inherently unreliable.' 91
Therefore, the benefit derived from court-appointed counsel is the
knowledge that justice in an American court is not dependent upon a
defendant's ability to afford counsel. Although in some cases appointment of counsel may actually make no difference to the outcome of a trial and, in reality, be completely unnecessary, the sixth
and fourteenth amendments, and related case law, deem it completely necessary.
CONCLUSION

Federal and state courts are divided as to whether uncounseled
DWI convictions may be used to impose mandatory minimum prison
sentences on repeat DWI offenders. The Supreme Court's decision in
Scott interprets Argersinger as establishing the line for appointment
185.
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See, e.g., Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
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of counsel at actual incarceration. However, neither Scott nor
Argersinger answered the question whether a constitutionally valid
uncounseled DWI conviction, not resulting in incarceration, could be
used for collateral purposes. Baldasar held that such a conviction
may not be used to enhance prison terms for subsequent convictions.
However, because the justices in Baldasar were unable to agree
upon a rationale for their decision, the courts apply Baldasar in
DWI repeat offender cases with differing results. Some courts narrow the application of Baldasar by permitting the use of prior uncounseled convictions to impose mandatory minimum prison terms in
repeat DWI offender cases. Using factual distinctions, "status" rationale, and public policy arguments, these courts hold Baldasar inapplicable in repeat DWI offender cases.
Other courts interpret Baldasarbroadly to disallow the use of uncounseled convictions for imposing mandatory minimum prison
terms in repeat DWI offender cases. These courts hold that the essential Baldasar inquiry is whether incarceration is based solely
upon an uncounseled conviction. If it is, they apply Baldasar to prohibit the incarceration. These courts reject the "status" rationale and
public policy arguments and hold that Baldasar is applicable in repeat DWI offender cases.
Because the rationale used by courts that interpret Baldasar narrowly do not pass muster in light of the Supreme Court's sixth
amendment decisions, that rationale should be rejected. When the
underlying rationale of Baldasar is remembered, that uncounseled
convictions are inherently unreliable and should not be used to enhance prison terms for subsequent offenses, factual distinctions fade
in importance. Also unconvincing are the attempts to superimpose
the "status" rationale of Lewis onto DWI repeat offender cases. Finally, although the appointment of counsel in DWI cases may impose an economic burden on the states, the sixth and fourteenth
amendments, and related case law, require it. Accordingly, uncounseled convictions should not be used to impose mandatory prison
sentences on repeat DWI offenders.
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